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This article aims to contrast modern macroeconomic analysis with a non-
Walrasian or evolutionary macroeconomics. This debate, which returns to the
forefront with each major economic crisis, concerns the nature of coordination
problems and the means of resolving them. While modern macroeconomic
models describe the inter-temporal optimization behaviour of consumers who
are perfectly adapted to their environment and cleared markets, evolutionary
macroeconomics focuses on market imbalances that require adaptive behav-
iours. This contrast affects monetary and fiscal policy as well as the nature of
any structural reforms to be carried out. It also affects the type of modelling to
be developed.
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Neither classical macroeconomics, which is oriented towards the
examination of supply conditions, nor Keynesian macroeconomics,
which focuses on demand constraints, are able to shed light on the
development of market economies that by their very nature are system-
atically confronted with structural shocks, whether this concerns
technologies, preferences or even institutional and organizational
forms. Dealing with this challenge requires taking seriously the role of
time and understanding how the short-term and long-term are articu-
lated, not in the sense that short-term events might be controlled by a
long-term equilibrium identified with an attractor, but because there is
no long-term path other than the one resulting from the way in which
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Jean-Luc Gaffard236short-term imbalances are linked one after another. In other words, the
debate is not between a demand economics and a supply economics,
but between equilibrium macroeconomics and disequilibrium macroe-
conomics, and more broadly between a Walrasian-inspired general
equilibrium theory (dynamic and stochastic), now the paradigm of
contemporary macroeconomics, and an evolutionary macroeconomics.
This debate, which inevitably brings back to the surface with every
major economic crisis, deals with the nature of the coordination prob-
lems encountered and how to respond to them. For economists in the
Walrasian tradition, markets are systematically cleared through the
price mechanism. This is true of the tâtonnement mechanism elabo-
rated by Walras as well as the renegotiation mechanism introduced by
Edgeworth. This is also true of the mechanism of rational expectations
according to which the errors are not correlated over time and do not
call for a revision of the agents' plans. This is true, finally, of the coordi-
nation on a bad equilibrium, in a world characterised by the existence
of multiple equilibria, which is revealing of bad institutions. Contempo-
rary macroeconomics belongs to this framework. The economy
described is, by definition, always in equilibrium. In counterpoint to
this tradition, an evolutionary macroeconomics, which we will call non-
Walrasian, or which could also be called Marshallian, retains as a coor-
dination failure, not coordination on a bad equilibrium, but market
imbalances that call for sequential adjustments in prices and quantities.
The purpose of the following is to establish the fragments of this
non-Walrasian macroeconomics by walking in the footsteps of Smith,
Ricardo, Wicksell, Marshall and Keynes as Hicks (1933, 1947, 1956,
1973, 1974 , 1979, 1990) and Leijonhufvud (1968, 1990, 1992, 2000,
2006, 2008, 2009) did: these references highlight that the question is
not whether one is orthodox or heterodox, or whether one intends to
join one school of thought or another, but rather the need to identify
the appropriate methods for dealing with a given subject, in this case
the viability conditions of a market economy confronted with recurrent
structural shocks.
1. The Paradigm of Contemporary Macroeconomics 
Contemporary macroeconomics, in whichever version, is the
product of two analytical ruptures and of a sort of reconciliation. The
first of these ruptures is that introduced between the short term and
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and supply-driven growth, be it demographic supply or technological
supply. The second of these ruptures is that which dissociates the rate
of inflation resulting from fiscal and monetary drifts, for which the
government is responsible, and the rate of unemployment whose
natural or structural level reflects the degree of imperfection that
affects the markets for goods as well as the labour market. The reconcil-
iation consists in defining a long-term equilibrium, entirely determined
by technologies, preferences and institutions, which is the unique
attractor, meaning that any deviation is absorbed, if not immediately,
at least in the short term. 
A doctrinal corpus was thus formed that is common to economists
of the new classical school and those of the new Keynesian school;
both retain real business cycles as a benchmark and predict that
getting closer to it can only improve the overall well-being. What is
new analytically and methodologically stems from the fact that the
equilibrium is no longer associated with a steady state, but takes the
form of cycles impelled by successive productivity shocks, to which
consumers maximizing their utility and endowed with rational expec-
tations respond.
The reference is that of a dynamic and stochastic general equilib-
rium, the modern version of the general market equilibrium analysed
by Walras, characterized by perfect information communicated by the
price system, full competition, the neutrality of money and the absence
of government. In these conditions it is no surprise that the rules
enacted to achieve such an equilibrium involve making markets more
flexible through structural reforms, ensuring monetary neutrality,
setting up an independent central bank dedicated at targeting a near-
zero inflation rate, ensuring that the public budgets are strictly
balanced, and even cutting both public taxes and expenditures in
order to disrupt as little as possible what is deemed to be an optimal
allocation of resources resulting from private choices.
The debate on the scope of structural reforms is a perfect illustration
of what currently unites and divides economists who share this same
vision of economic dynamics. For some, structural reforms are efficient
in both the short and long term. They believe that the prospect of
future gains associated with these reforms will on its own lead to an
increase in permanent income, encouraging households to consume
more and firms to invest more, even if the implementation of these
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these reforms are still considered as appropriate in the long term, the
possible fall in demand in the short-term could have an impact on the
potential growth rate due to the destruction they induce of physical
and human capital. They consider, then, that measures to prevent a
recession are necessary, which imply additional public spending and
the acceptance of a temporary increase in public debt. These hysteresis
effects can, however, only really be put forward if we abandon the
hypothesis of rational expectations – in other words, if we recognize
that knowledge is imperfect rather than sticking to an interplay of fric-
tions leading to price rigidity.
According to this approach, money and finance are neutral in the
long term if not even in the short term. The dichotomy between a real
sector and a monetary sector is de facto maintained. Monetary and
financial failures are not ignored. But they are the result of the inappro-
priate behaviour of a central bank that complies with the injunctions of
impecunious governments or of commercial banks that wind up
granting loans regardless of the solvency of the public and private
borrowers. The solution therefore lies in imposing rules on a now inde-
pendent central bank and in developing financial markets which are
opportunistically said to be efficient in that they set asset prices that are
consistent with fundamentals.
The essence of this analytic corpus is to describe an economy out of
time, represented as a system self-regulated by market forces and
subject only to frictions attributable to bad behaviours. Present and
future decisions are de facto synchronized and fully coordinated with
each other. An objective reality is presumed to pre-exist justifying the
hypothesis of rational expectations.
2. The Foundations of a Disequilibrium Macroeconomics
Recent experience, in particular in a Europe experiencing mounting
disorder, shows that the self-regulating mechanisms of the market can
be blocked, due not to exogenous shocks, but to a sequence of imbal-
ances that are in the very nature of capitalist market economies,
without needing to point out market imperfections or deviant behav-
iour, but simply recognizing that knowledge is imperfect. The attempt
to reconcile microeconomics and macroeconomics, in short, to unify
macroeconomics, which is at the heart of analysis in terms of real
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radical reversal of perspective. This implies considering that the short-
term disequilibria affect the long-term profile of the economy, that
growth is not independent of fluctuations, and that a real economy is
always in disequilibrium due simply to ignorance about future change
(Hicks, 1933). In fact, two very different characterizations of economic
dynamics need to be distinguished in the literature (Day, 1993). In
one, the behaviour of agents adapted to their environment is described
by optimal strategies with regard to technologies and preferences and
all the possible future consequences of their actions. In the other, the
issue is how an economy works in which agents adapt, prices evolve
and exchanges take place out of equilibrium.
According to the latter approach, inputs are dissociated from
outputs and costs from proceeds. These distortions are transmitted
over time, making the evolution of the economy depend on what
happens step by step. Let us consider the case of a major innovation
characterized by the fact that the construction cost of a new produc-
tive capacity exceeds the replacement cost of the existing one, more
than counterbalanced, of course, by a reduction of its utilization cost
and an increase of its efficiency (Hicks 1973). With given resources, the
investment measured in units of productive capacity is reduced due to
the increase in the unit construction cost. If wages are fixed, at the end
of the construction period of the new productive capacity there will be
a lower productive capacity in general, which will result in a fall of
gross output and then in employment. This, we may recall, is the case
of Ricardo’s machinery effect, which shows how the unemployment
resulting from technical progress is not due to the specific features of
the new technology introduced, superior by definition, but to the
economic conditions of the transition process from the old to the new
technology. With flexible wages, and full employment, the increase in
construction costs will nevertheless bring about a fall of gross output,
associated now with a fall in labour productivity, which will no longer
measure the efficiency of the technology but the difficulties of the tran-
sition. 
True, in the specific analysis carried out by Hicks, an ad hoc hypoth-
esis, that of full performance of the economy, allows a continuous
matching of supply and demand and the convergence to a new equi-
librium, with the consequence that unemployment is fully reabsorbed,
thus reducing the traverse to a predetermined mechanical trajectory. 
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advance that the Hicks model implies. As a matter of fact the question
is not to know whether it provides an analytical framework able to deal
properly with all the features of qualitative changes, but whether it
deals properly with one essential dimension of change characterized by
the phenomena of novelty and hysteresis. The crucial point, here, is
that unemployment is not the consequence of the specific properties
of the new technology, but rather a feature of the very process of
change: as a matter of fact, the result of the sequential interaction
between the decisions and constraints sketching out this process. The
simplifying hypothesis adopted by Hicks, which amounts to make
specific reference to a perfect barter economy, doesn’t actually affect
the basic structure of the model. The effects of a distortion of produc-
tive capacity on productivity and employment, brought to light with
the model, emerge in all circumstances and not only in the case of a
perfect barter economy. 
The distortions introduced in the temporal structure of production
coupled with the lack of perfect knowledge produce variations in the
apparent productivity of labour and profitability, inflationary or defla-
tionary pressures, deficits or surpluses in trade balances, and budget
deficits or surpluses. These imbalances are not reducible to market fail-
ures or deviant behavior. They are in the nature of the processes of
change. It is illusory, if not dangerous, to want to eradicate them ab
initio. They are transitory phenomena that are as necessary as they are
compelled. The viability of the paths followed by the economy requires
containing them through appropriate institutions that cannot be
reduced to intangible rules.
Because there is a time needed to build a production capacity,
choices cannot be simultaneous as is assumed in dynamic, stochastic
general equilibrium models. It happens, as Keynes pointed out, that a
decision to save today is not the same as a decision to consume
tomorrow. Taking stock of the time needed to invest in productive
assets does not dispense with examining the conditions that make it
possible to do this. Firms may not want or be able to do the inter-
temporal trade of expected revenues from future output for the factor
services needed to produce this output. Sometimes they cannot and
do not want to finance productive investment. This inter-temporal
failure of demand cannot be resolved simply by cutting interest rates
(Leijonhufvud, 2008).
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iours and are decided en route set the path followed, without it being
predetermined. Growth – stronger or weaker, steadier or more fluctu-
ating – depends on it. The inflation rate and unemployment rate are
joint products and therefore cannot be dissociated from one another,
even if the relationship between them is not stable. Money and finance
are not neutral, neither in the short nor long-term. There is no natural
interest rate, no natural unemployment rate, and no potential growth
rate that obeys strictly real forces, but rather variables that respond to
the conditions of adjustment on markets in disequilibrium (Tobin,
1972, 1995).
The path is created by walking it. There is therefore no attractor, nor
can there be any rational expectations. Private choices do, of course,
react to economic policy choices, but the reverse is equally true. In
short, the acquisition of knowledge, which remains imperfect, is the
result of out-of-equilibrium interactions, taking place step by step,
between economic agents as well as the institutions regulating their
behaviour. The challenge for all decision-makers lies in mastering
clocks, indeed in their ability to project themselves over a sufficiently
lengthy time.
In this perspective, stocks may act as buffers between physical
inflows and outflows, and between financial income and expenditure
flows (Leijonhufvud 1973). In particular, stocks of liquid assets allow
expenditures to be maintained when revenues fall off. Thus real world
economies could be more robust than pure flow models would
suggest. However, if disturbances are of an unexpectedly large magni-
tude, buffer stocks may be exhausted and a tight income constraint
takes over.
Moreover, the role of real and financial stocks is ambivalent. On one
hand, they may effectively act as buffers. On the other hand, they may
reinforce the multiplier effect. Debts may act as buffers as well as
amplify demand constraints. Thus, deflation increases the real value of
existing debt, and the price effects may themselves be deviation ampli-
fying. An increasing indebtedness of households, which may hide, for a
while, the effects on output of large displacements of potential
demand, will end by affecting current spending, when it appears that
these households are insolvent.
Clearly, given technologies and/or preferences cannot univocally
determine production and consumption paths, and hence the evolu-
Jean-Luc Gaffard242tion of the economy, as standard economic models purport. Because
of ignorance of future changes in technologies and preferences and still
more of the consequences of these changes, a long-term equilibrium is
never attainable (Hicks 1933 p. 32).
3. Price Flexibility in Question
To deal with change in this way, by emphasizing the coordination
failures and the means of dealing with them, inevitably leads to ques-
tioning the effects of a greater or lesser degree of price and wage
flexibility. Variations in each of these play a role in medium-term devel-
opments in the economy due to the associated changes in income, and
they dominate the course of events (Solow, 2000). Doing away with
the principle of total flexibility, which would make prices instantly be
equilibrium prices, rendering pointless any reflection about a coordina-
tion that is supposedly instantaneously achieved, raises the issue of the
impact of the degree of price flexibility on the way the imbalances
develop. It is commonly accepted that, by increasing the debt burden,
a general fall in prices increases supply surpluses rather than reducing
them. Leaving aside this deflationary situation, the discussion is still
open. There is, nevertheless, a presumption that prices that are too
brutally and excessively flexible are damaging. Marshall was fully aware
of this when he insisted on the impact of adjustment speeds on market
dynamics, emphasizing the possibility of chaotic fluctuations in the case
of flexibility in prices and quantities, thereby making a case for short-
term fixed prices in order to avoid this chaos (Leijonhufvud, 1994).
There are several dimensions to the problem. Excessive price changes
are likely to create greater uncertainty, which affects the value of corpo-
rate assets, exacerbating fluctuations in overall output through the
effects on production, hiring and investment decisions (Stiglitz, 1999).
Price variations, when they go in the wrong direction and become
excessive, can contribute to amplifying disturbances that affect the
structure of production capacity. They lead to alternating between the
excessive destruction of capacity and bottlenecks, inevitably causing
erratic fluctuations in output and consequently a fall in the growth rate
(Amendola and Gaffard, 1988, 1998, 2006).
Price volatility reveals the inability of agents to make a reliable
economic calculation, which leads them to react instantaneously to
current events and to shelve investment plans made in the past. The
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production capacity (Heymann and Leijonhufvud, 1996; Leijonhufvud,
1997).
In these circumstances, the criticism aimed at analyses that recog-
nize the existence of imbalanced markets, i.e. that they violate the
assumption of individual rationality by denying that agents are capable
of exploiting the gains in exchanges, does not hold. Relative price
rigidity comes from rational behaviour insofar as it is a factor of viability
of an economy facing structural changes amidst an uncertain future.
The question of the impact of more or less price flexibility in a
context of market imbalances and agent heterogeneity sheds light on
the true costs of inflation (Heymann and Leijonhufvud, 1996;
Leijonhufvud, 1977, 1997). These costs result from the disorder
created, beyond a certain threshold, in relative prices, in the distribu-
tion of income and wealth, and in the temporal structure of production
capacity, by resulting in preventing market mechanisms from func-
tioning properly. The real problem that agents face is not that they take
a change in the general level of prices for a change in relative prices,
but that they are unable to correctly interpret the price signals that
result from relative price changes due to the inflationary process. As a
result, the necessary reallocations of resources are not made, while
others are made that should not be. While excessively low inflation is
costly in terms of lost jobs, which also makes the necessary structural
adaptations more difficult, high inflation goes hand in hand with a
shortening of the time horizon, a decline in investment and destruction
that threatens the viability of the economy (Georgescu-Roegen, 1968).
While sticky prices provide an anchor that helps stabilize the economy,
excessively flexible and erratic prices lead to destroying inter-temporal
stability, possibly creating the conditions for high inflation (Heymann
and Leijonhufvud, 1996; Leijonhufvud, 1997).
What is true of the prices of goods holds just as much for wages.
Wages are, if not rigid, then at least sticky, since employers are reluc-
tant to raise wages too much because of a shortage of labour for fear of
disrupting the established differentials, and they are just as reluctant to
lower wages due to unemployment for fear of alienating those they
employ. This rigidity is not a matter of a monetary illusion, it is a ques-
tion of continuity as well as equity (Hicks, 1975). If excessive wage
flexibility occurs, it could be the signal that behaviour is dominating
that breaks up continuity, disrupts economic calculations and reduces
the time horizon of economic agents to the detriment of growth.
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Out of equilibrium, it is difficult to maintain the proposition that
monetary policy must be dedicated exclusively to maintaining stable
prices, for two reasons: there is no evidence that it is necessary to
systematically thwart inflationary pressures; and it may be necessary to
conduct monetary policy with the aim of counteracting the risk of
global instability. This affects the rules that must be applied.
When monetary policy responds to real shocks whose adverse
effects are not countered by price flexibility, simply because the
optimal prices are not known and because a high price flexibility is no
guarantee of discovering them, fighting against any inflationary drift
will not be sufficient to restore growth. On the contrary, inflationary
pressures, in this case transitory, must be accepted in order to re-estab-
lish a quasi-steady state when the required investment results in a
distribution of purchasing power without an immediate counterpart in
terms of the supply of consumer goods. The reason is that building
new production capacity takes time. This is the case in an economy
undergoing reconstruction (Hicks, 1947), but also in an economy
facing a technological shock that results in creative destruction.
Combating these pressures systematically would simply wind up penal-
izing investment and preventing the transition from being successful
(Amendola and Gaffard, 1998, 2006). A decision about how to weight
the objectives of price and growth is not trivial. Price stability today
does not guarantee growth tomorrow. There is no stable relationship
between inflation and unemployment, due to structural disruptions,
including variations in the resulting dispersion of net excess demand in
different sectors (Tobin, 1972, 1995).
In these circumstances, monetary rules should not be rigid. Rules
and discretionary choice must be combined. The credit system must be
managed by a central bank whose operations need to be determined
on the basis of an expediency judgment. Some accommodation of
monetary policy in response to real cyclical growth is appropriate,
although there is no simple criterion for knowing the exact dose of
accommodation needed (Leijonhufvud, 1990). In a context of struc-
tural change, the adoption of rigid rules, supposedly in order to
optimize under the false presumption that errors of perception
concerning the natural interest rate or the potential growth rate are
small, proves to be costly in terms of inflation and unemployment
(Orphanides and Williams, 2002). The best strategy, then, is to make
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activity, implying a certain degree of inertia. Inertia has a simple justifi-
cation: raising the interest rate sharply to counteract inflationary
pressures will undermine investment and may lead to a shortfall in
future capacity, i.e. future inflationary pressures that can be antici-
pated. Keeping the interest rate too low due solely to the absence of
inflationary pressures, despite a low unemployment rate, can lead to an
excess investment in productive assets, and also an excess investment
in financial and real estate assets. Thus, the quantitative easing policy
enacted recently with a view to stimulating activity and returning to a
positive inflation rate in order to escape the constraints of a zero
interest rate has had the main if not sole effect of promoting the
purchase of existing financial assets, at the risk of provoking a new
financial crisis.
In fact, the problem goes beyond monetary policy that is defined
without the need to refer to the behaviour of financial and non-finan-
cial actors to include the organization of the banks and the functioning
of the financial markets. It is, of course, important to strengthen micro
and macro-prudential measures, and equally so to ensure that firms
benefit from patient capital.
To understand this, it must be remembered that liquidity is a
complex notion, in the sense that it is not reducible to holding money
or readily negotiable assets (Hicks, 1974). There are actually three types
of financial assets: current assets, reserve assets and speculative assets.
The first are essentially complementary to the real assets required to
produce and therefore cannot be considered liquid. The second type,
which refers to the ability to raise funds on the markets or to borrow
from banks, is the liquidity required to pursue an investment activity
with a long-term involvement. The third type are held for immediate
gain and are not directly related to production and investment activity.
This distinction, which is probably difficult to establish empirically with
respect to the last two categories, is significant as to the meaning
imparted to liquidity, in that it reflects a sequence of choices and not a
one-off choice. The function of liquidity is to preserve a capacity for
choice in the future, knowing that all investments are not equivalent,
depending on whether or not they correspond to future demand.
Nevertheless, there is a dilemma. On the one hand, liquidity is a
matter of a sequence of choices because market information is not
immediately available whereas investments in real assets are irreversible,
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uncertainty, the social function of liquidity being that it gives time to
think. But, on the other hand, learning is the result, not of the passing of
time, but of a firm commitment, implying that finance commitment is a
necessary condition for the other stakeholders to embark on an innova-
tion process. Given that any investment has a gestation time that is
longer as the expected productivity gains are higher, and that, in addi-
tion, successive investments are complementary to one another, which
explains the weak influence of interest rate changes on the current
investment rate (Hicks, 1989), firms must be able to benefit from a long
financial commitment, i.e. from patient capital, whether this is provided
by banks or by shareholders (Mayer, 2013). As a matter of fact, “there
must usually be a practical distinction between ‘inside’ shareholders,
who feel themselves to be closely associated with the company, so that
(like established labour) they expect to go on holding for considerable
periods, and the fleeting population of shareholders who are loosely
attached. All shareholders alike will have to be paid the dividend, but
while the outsiders are concerned with no more than the current divi-
dend and with the market value of the shares, the insiders are
concerned with the future of the company, and so with the dividends
they expect, on their own information, to receive at future dates”
(Hicks, 1989, pp. 87-88). Therefore, monetary analysis should focus on
the coordination needed to make a credible commitment in irreversible
investments, and monetary policy should aim at influencing investment
decisions of this type rather than only targeting the inflation rate. Its
effectiveness depends on its ability to affect the liquidity of firms and
banks. The inefficiency of monetary policy is due not to the fact that the
interest rate is at bottom but to the behaviour of the banks and, more
generally, to the organization of the financial system whenever it prior-
itizes a rapid return on investment (Stiglitz, 2017).
5. Fiscal Policy: Rules Versus Discretionary Choices
In the world of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, if
expected inflation exceeds the set target, the central bank sharply and
abruptly raises its interest rate to quickly bring the inflation rate back to
the required level. In such a world, the government should only reluc-
tantly pursue an expansionary fiscal policy, as it will anticipate that any
increase in aggregate demand driven by rising government spending
will be offset by an equivalent reduction due to central bank action
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over, when monetary policy is tight and fiscal policy lax, the lack of
monetary financing of the public deficit causes the public debt to rise.
There comes a time when fiscal solvency is no longer assured. Unless
the deficit is cut drastically, there is no alternative to monetizing the
debt and, therefore, to high inflationary pressures (Sargent and
Wallace, 1981). To escape this unpleasant arithmetic would simply
require imposing a fiscal rule.
This arithmetic is, however, belied when it comes to a sequence of
events out of equilibrium that is induced by the formation of distortions
in the temporal structure of production capacity. Imbalances follow
one after the other and can be amplified, resorbed or offset. Thus,
excess supply and unemployment can be followed by excess demand
and inflationary pressures. Therefore, increasing public spending today
and correspondingly increasing public debt will reduce the excess
supply and current unemployment, while taxing income later will
reduce, also later, excess demand and inflationary pressures. In this
case, the increase in public debt does not reduce current consumption,
while the subsequent repayment of this debt will reduce future
consumption to the benefit of the economy over the period as a whole.
The temporal dimension of Keynesian policy is related here to the poor
temporal distribution of excess demand that is left unadjusted by inter-
temporal price adjustments (Leijonhufvud 1992). Needless to say, the
Ricardian equivalence between borrowing and tax – meaning that
fiscal policy is ineffective – does not hold. Out of equilibrium, no action
is neutral. Only an active policy is likely to maintain the economy’s
stability. When a budget deficit follows a rise in private savings and a
downturn in activity, the real question is how long must a budget
deficit be accepted and what should be its amount before public
spending can be boosted by private spending. The challenge is to
maintain or re-establish a relative balance between supply and demand
at each moment and over time.
When a restrictive monetary policy constrains investment, as was
the case in Europe in the 1990s, it is the pattern of the fluctuations that
is changed. The recurring shortfall in investment has the effect, cycle
after cycle, of reducing the rate of growth compatible with price
stability and of pushing up the unemployment rate that doesn’t accel-
erate inflation, which some people call the equilibrium unemployment
rate, as lower investment today means a lower level of output
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neously imposing a constraint on the budget deficit maintains and
aggravates the fluctuations. It leads to a fall in public spending during a
recession, accentuating the slowdown and helping to reduce the dura-
tion of the subsequent recovery phase by undermining public
investment. It leaves the door open to the possibility of lowering taxes
without a corresponding decline in public spending during boom
periods, creating inflationary pressures that can in turn lead to a tight-
ening of monetary policy and a premature turnaround in the economy.
No effective constraint is introduced in the expansionary phases of the
cycle, but the recessions are amplified, which cannot be interpreted as
deviations from a predetermined trend, but rather as a phase of an
essentially endogenous development that the budget constraint helps
to shape. The rules, which are supposed to avoid the unpleasant arith-
metic described by Sargent and Wallace (1981), plunge the economy
into a highly unpleasant series of imbalances.
When, as happened in the United States in the 2000s, the inflation
rate is contained despite rising household indebtedness, in view of the
rule, there is no need to raise the interest rate nor worry about
lowering it. The strict application of the monetary rule did not,
however, prevent the budget deficit from widening. Faith in the virtues
of the rule and misjudging the true causes of price changes masked the
unsustainable nature of private debt and prevented anticipating the
outbreak of the financial crisis, which ultimately led to a further
increase in the budget deficit.
When the budget deficit and the public debt have increased as a
result of a fall in activity, and if, as was the case with the sovereign debt
crisis in the euro area, it is impossible for the central bank to intervene
as lender of last resort, the financial markets become the masters of the
game and impose a rise in interest rates, in this case highly differenti-
ated interest rates. It is these markets, and not the central bank, that,
via the interest rate, enforce a form of fiscal discipline. This arithmetic is
very likely to cause a further downturn in activity and a further
widening of the budget deficit.
In all these situations, the unpleasant arithmetic of equilibrium gives
way to the no less unpleasant dynamics of disequilibrium, which calls
for a policy mix that takes into account the role of time in the face of
the adjustments necessitated by structural shocks. This means that
both inflationary pressures and budget deficits must be accepted
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economies that are naturally in disequilibrium.
The impact of a fiscal stimulus is of course highly dependent on the
state in which an economy is found. In a depressed economy, charac-
terized by massive unemployment and excess capacity in all its sectors,
which is what Keynes referred to, a decision by producers to hire and to
raise wages would create a solvent demand to which producers would
respond instantly. Nevertheless, coordination between aggregate
supply and demand requires public intervention in the form of allow-
ances paid to the unemployed or hiring for public works. A signal is
thus sent to firms that a solvent demand exists. The multiplier effect on
income and employment is then necessarily high because of the match
between available capacity and the increased demand thus obtained.
The same does not hold in the case of a recessionary economy for
several reasons. In general, the supply structure is not in harmony with
the demand structure, and efforts to stimulate demand are usually
hampered by bottlenecks resulting from a lack of available production
capacity, including due to a lack of the required workforce skills.
Second, an increase in demand leads firms to raise the utilization rate of
their production capacity but not necessarily their investments, either
because they are excessively indebted or because they do not have
sufficient information on the nature and volume of future demand. This
leads them to adopt a wait-and-see position, as they prefer to maintain
liquidity by keeping their reserve assets or preserving their capacity to
take on debt, with the aim of better identifying the type of investment
to be made. The initially higher multiplier effect of public spending is,
in all cases, reduced. Fiscal policy must be part of a policy mix that
includes monetary policy, but also, as mentioned above, the organiza-
tion of the financing system and, undoubtedly, the organization of the
markets, with the objective of extending the time horizon of the firms.
6. Revisiting Structural Reforms
Structural reforms refer to a certain idea about what the microeco-
nomic foundations of macroeconomics should be, in this case perfectly
flexible markets that guarantee being on the best trajectory. However,
far from leading to an increase in productivity, they can constitute real
obstacles to innovation by generating forms of dualism. It is difficult, in
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are possible in the long term without having to worry about the chain
of events that may occur as a consequence of structural reforms or
simply as the already proven consequence of flexible markets. While it
is possible to imagine rational behaviour guided by expectations of
permanent income in the absence of the destruction of resources, this
same hypothesis becomes untenable once economic agents are
confronted, not only with a fall in their remuneration, but also with a
narrowing of their time horizon due to such destruction and to the
resulting hysteresis effects.
The destruction of jobs in declining activities requires that the
employees concerned be mobile occupationally and geographically.
Reducing job protection and lowering wages in these activities so as to
encourage mobility is not a solution. Everything depends on what
happens to the labour resources.
In fact, the resources released, far from being directed to higher-
paying, high-tech activities, could well be compelled to move to activi-
ties where the jobs on offer are low-skilled, sometimes part-time and
often precarious. This explains, moreover, why a situation of almost full
employment does not go hand in hand with inflationary pressures, as
can be seen currently in the United States.
The fall in the wages of workers made redundant in troubled indus-
trial sectors and hired on precarious contracts in low-productivity
protected sectors leads to the impoverishment of a large part of the
population, which will result in a fall in domestic demand. This can be
thwarted only by granting consumer loans to these impoverished
households, which is not without risk if a lack of solvency were to push
the economy into a crisis, as happened in the United States in 2008.
This form of reconversion, and the attendant fall in wages, also
affect the accumulation of human capital and, consequently, potential
growth. In the face of financial constraints, the workers will have
neither the time nor the financial means to train themselves, even if
they are encouraged to do so by the wage differential with skilled
workers, especially since the credit market is imperfect and it is not
possible for them to take out a loan against their future income.
The dualism that sets in, being synonymous with deepening
inequalities and the decline of the middle class, affects the structure of
demand. The wealthiest households buy luxury goods manufactured in
small volumes, sometimes abroad, or use their abundant savings for
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households turn away from domestic products and buy low-cost prod-
ucts made in low-wage countries. A form of deindustrialization takes
place, which has the effect of reducing productivity gains, export
capacity and the potential growth rate, unless the strategy set out by
business and approved by the government leads to capturing external
markets and to rooting growth in the export of industrial goods, as
happened in the case of Germany.
In short, the clearest result of labour market flexibility may be a
polarization between high-skilled, high-wage jobs and unskilled, low-
paid jobs, with a fall in median wages. This would then look much like
an internal devaluation, more appropriately called wage deflation,
which is actually aimed at boosting the market shares of domestic firms
in the hope that growth will be driven by exports.
It is not labour market rigidities that are directing investment and
technological decisions in such a way that these investments have a
negative effect on productivity and growth, but rather the develop-
ment of dualism in the labour market accompanied by a fall in the
median wage, which affects the structure of the economy and its
capacity for medium-term growth. This is undoubtedly the reason
why, in the most recent period, productivity gains were as weak in the
United States as in the euro zone countries, despite significant differ-
ences in terms of job protection, the intensity of competition in the
goods and services markets, the weight of the public sector, taxation
and the innovation effort.
This observation invites us to reconsider what might be the microe-
conomic foundations of macroeconomics. The commitment of the
owners of capital to engage in long-term investment is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for other stakeholders in the company –
employees, suppliers and customers – to commit in turn. These
different actors also need to benefit from mutual guarantees of their
commitment. These guarantees are obtained through the conclusion
of agreements that establish long-term relations, in the form of lengthy
contracts (employment contracts, sub-contracting agreements, and
distribution contracts) that structure industrial organization (Rich-
ardson, 1990). The search for immediate responsiveness to the current
signals, which is hidden behind the current idea of flexibility, gives
place here to an entrepreneurship dedicated to the creation of value
rather than its diversion, a capacity at the heart of the process of
competition through innovation.
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With the stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model, anything
can happen. This does not mean that we know why an event has
happened, nor that we can conclude that it is the result of inter-
temporal optimization behaviour. This modelling makes it possible to
introduce all the ad hoc elements that one wants, whether this means
different types of shocks (of supply and demand) or frictions
(consumption habits, cost of adjustment of the capital stock), making it
difficult to understand the sequence of events (Stiglitz, 2017) – but not
without concluding that there is ultimately a final cause of what has
happened, in this case market failures, understood as a lack of flexi-
bility, implying that economic policy should be conducted in such a
way as to correct these. The economy jumps instantly from one equi-
librium to another, with no consideration of the dynamics engendered
by the unexpected formation of real or financial stocks. Future markets
are eventually considered, but without imagining that crises can make
these disappear rather than creating them (Heymann and Leijon-
hufvud, 1996). No temporal dependence phenomenon is considered,
even when Markov processes are introduced according to which, if the
present state makes it possible to predict the future state, the predic-
tion is not improved by knowledge of past information.
In fact, in this type of model, constant laws govern the relations
between events, which winds up with the economic agents being
known, and corresponds to what Hicks (1979) calls contemporary
causality. Nothing is said about the opportunity or the possibility of
answering in one way or another to the signals emitted. The reference
period is an accounting period that is, by definition, completely arbi-
trary and whose duration has no influence on the final result.
The sequential causality that Hicks (1979) opposes to contemporary
causality negates the existence of such constant laws. It means that
multiple and varied evolutions are possible, conditioned by the variety
of eligible choices taken en route. Decisions appear for what they are,
that is, choices constrained by the heritage of the past (embodied in
real and financial stocks) and creators of future constraints or, if you
prefer, they are milestones along the causal chain. They call for an
appreciation of the opportunity and possibility of the choices involved
at each stage. Time periods become decisive in the course of evolution:
the time that elapses between the signal (coming from the market or
the authorities) and the decision-making; and the time that elapses
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variable. The reaction to the signal can be fast or slow. The same is true
of the actual implementation of the decision taken. An increase in
income does not necessarily result in an increase in consumption, both
because consumers can wait to know more about the signal sent and
because the goods they intend to demand are not immediately avail-
able. An increase in costs does not lead to an increase in prices, because
entrepreneurs wait to find out what their competitors will do, or
because they might be bound by medium-term contracts with their
customers, or because they prefer to cut their margins. Holding stocks
of assets, including liquidity, and access to credit are factors that influ-
ence the length of these time periods and, consequently, expectations
that become essentially endogenous.
The evolutionary economic analysis thus conceived should be
ordered in two parts: a theory of the elementary period, which must be
completed by a theory of the continuation, which is concerned with
the effects produced by the events of the earlier periods on the plans
and expectations that determine the events of subsequent periods
(Hicks, 1956, 1990).
The difficulty with such a dynamic analysis method stems from the
fact that disequilibrium forces are much less reliable than equilibrium
forces. Multiple paths can be taken with configurations that are the fruit
of the sequence of disequilibria, in the centre of which are the stocks
that are the expression and the vector of propagation. The path that
will actually be taken is due not only to the animal spirits of the decision
makers, but also and mainly to the role of institutions. However diverse
these may be, they must have a major objective: to constrain the paths
followed, to smooth out fluctuations by recognizing the need for
certain forms of rigidity or inertia, with the aim of allowing the various
actors to cope with the combined interplay of uncertainty and irreversi-
bility and to be projected over a sufficiently long time.
The analytical approach thus sketched out is characterized as non-
Walrasian in order to clearly indicate that it ruptures with models that
persist in the description of equilibria, even if they are multiple, with
their claim to novelty based on insisting on the complexity of relations,
the multiplicity of agents and the shocks they suffer, and the asym-
metries or incompleteness of information, but without recognizing the
sequential dimension of economic processes and the time dependence
of events rooted in real and monetary phenomena.
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